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Introduction 
There is increasing certainty around the idea that rationality, state 
dependence and other regarding preferences are not mutually exclusive.1 The 
belief that they are itself derives from a mis-equivocation of the Homo 
economicus model with rationality. This is a mistaken belief. The Homo 
economicus model, which rests on a Benthamite understanding of human 
behavior as self-interested, utility-maximizing and chained to the “two 
sovereign masters" of pain and pleasure, is severely limited in its relevance to 
human behavior at best, mistaken at worst, and cannot be redeemed by 
accounting for limited information and uncertainty. We will discuss the most 
glaring defects of the model in the following two chapters, but we can satiate 
ourselves at present with the assertion that there exist certain other regarding 
preferences in human beings not reflected in the model, including a desire for 
esteem and certain elements of altruism that cannot be explained by self-
interested utility maximization, and that these are often times influenced by 
external contexts (states). 
The paper is organized into five chapters of varying length, with 
chapters two and three making up the largest share. Chapter one introduces 
the idea of rationality, and attempts to briefly analyze human behavior as it 
relates to rationality. Chapters two and three study extensively occurrences of 
other-regarding preferences in human agents. Chapter four looks at how these 
preferences are influenced by states (contexts), and chapter five synthesizes 
the findings of the preceding chapters and looks at the case for picking up 
more fully the arguments presented in the paper in mainstream economics 
research. 
In the following, rationality as it relates to organic life, and particularly 
human beings, will be discussed in short. There is a lack of consensus in the 
social sciences today with respect to rationality. Certain branches, such as 
economics, make abundant use of it, whereas others, like psychology, often 
                                                             
1 These terms will be defined below. 
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reject (what they feel are) its fundamental premise. As we described above, 
the interpretation of rationality that is rejected is often times a mistaken one, 
and there are obvious drawbacks to this high level of diversity in basic micro-
foundations in the social sciences: contradiction, overlap of research, inability 
or constraint on trans- and multidisciplinary research, to name a few. A more 
thorough-going understanding of the rational actor model might provide a 
useful basis for a future synthesis of the social sciences, as Gintis (2009) 
argues. 
Gintis (2009, 1), drawing on Morgenstern and Von Neumann (1953), 
describes the rational actor model simply as representing “an individual with 
consistent preferences.” The criterion of consistency is measured on the basis 
of three major assumptions, namely: 
1. completeness of preferences: this assumption merely states that any event 
B is at least weakly preferred to itself. Consequences of completeness are 
reflexivity and exclusion. 
2. transitivity of preferences: if A ≽ B; and B ≽ C; then A ≽ C. 
3. independence of irrelevant alternatives: an individual's preferences for A 
& B do not depend on his/her preference for C. 
These three conditions form the core of modern rational agent theory. They 
essentially al-low the modeling of preferences as a continuous field and lie at 
the root of contemporary microeconomic theory. 
1. Bayesian Rationality 
In addition to the above conditions, we can state the conditions for Bayesian 
rationality, a relatively more demanding form of rationality that consists of 
preference updating via expected utility maximization, a fundamental building 
block of homo economicus. Given a lottery with n outcomes of the sort i ∈ n , 
whose individual probabilities, pi sum such that ∑ (i × pi) = 1, then  
1. The preference for a ≽ b depends solely on the states of nature" these two 
events or outcomes entail. In other words, if a′ = a and b′ = b, where a≠b 
and a′≠b′, then a ≽ b ↔ a′≽ b′.  
2. if P is a non-zero set from the underlying population of events and a ≽ b, 
then all outcomes where a occurs are preferred to outcomes where b 
occurs: (f = a∣P) ≽ P (f = b∣P) ↔ a ≽ b.  
3. Non-wishful thinking: beliefs about the probability of an outcome are 
independent of the payoffs of that outcome. Analytically, if we prefer a to b 
and a' to b', then we prefer an outcome O given event p (e.g., a coin toss) 
only if we prefer the outcome Q given given event r (e.g., a separate coin 
toss). Axiomatically:  
If O = a,b∣p , Q = a′,b′∣r , O′ = a,b∣(1−p), Q′ = a′,b′∣(1−r), then O ≽ 
O′↔ Q ≽ Q′.  
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4. Higher payoff outcomes are preferred: For any event p, if an outcome a has 
a higher payoff than a set of outcomes b(π), with π being a subset of p, 
then a should be strictly preferred to b: a ≻ b(π), then O = a∣p ≻ Q = b.  
5. Lastly, there is a condition that allows event subsets to be ranked 
ordinarily. For a set of outcomes a, b, a' and b' ∈ Ω where a ≻ b, there exist 
disjoint sets xi such that for any xi if a′ = O for ω ∈ xi and a′(ω) = a(ω) for 
ω≠xi , then a′≻ b. 
Granted these five complementary assumptions, Bayesian rationality obtains. 
2. Are People Rational? 
 
The next question is, of course, whether the conditions outlined above obtain 
in human beings. In order to shed light on whether or not this is true, it might 
be wise to consider when they do not obtain and thereby deduce when they 
do. This we do in the present section. Indeed, an appreciation of the rational 
agents model or of homo economicus requires knowledge about whether 
people are or aren't rational. This is an uncontroversial statement. The answer 
to this query is, however, not so clear. Traditional economic models (homo 
economicus being the most widely known) have been based on the premise 
that individuals are 1) utility-maximizing, 2) self-interested 3) individual 
agents. Thus, the primary medium that models have depended upon is 
sometimes referred to as a “selfish get". While there is a great deal of evidence 
that people are by and large rational, the empirical basis for this rationality, 
and particularly assumptions 1-3 above, has not been seriously explored in the 
literature until relatively recently. 
In the following, a number of results will be summarized. We will 
attempt to show that rationality and utility maximization are not necessarily 
coterminous. 
2.1. Biological basis for rational behavior 
Many would read a biological basis into rationality. There is also wide-ranging 
empirical data confirming rationality in human beings. This is the case even 
when apparent contradictions with rationality are present. For instance, there 
is a pronounced time in-consistency in much of human discounting behavior 
(Gintis 2009, 8). Time inconsistency refers to preferences by which the reward 
accrued by two different outcomes is discounted by a non-constant factor, i.e., 
the preference for a particular reward depends on the time from the present in 
which the reward is received. Human agents are generally time-inconsistent. 
This type of inconsistency is especially apparent when individuals are making 
choices with both long- and short term costs and benefits. Smoking is an ex-
ample of this: smoking has immediate benefits in the calming effects of 
nicotine, but significantly increases the risk of future illness and disease. Many 
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nevertheless “irrationally" smoke, discounting future costs in favor of 
immediate benefit. 
This type of inconsistency appears to be systematic in nature (Gintis 
2009, 9). At closer inspection, smoking does not appear to be irrational at all, 
although it evidently contradicts the principle of expected utility 
maximization. If we include a preference for cigarettes and reflect a certain 
degree of “present bias", it is easy to show that a rational agent may develop a 
preference for cigarettes (or unprotected sex, or any number of other “present 
biased" activities). 
It appears that long-term regarding preferences are a relatively late 
development in the evolution of homo sapiens. Long and short term-decision 
making are in fact localized in different parts of the brain, long term-decision 
making being localized in the (much more recently evolved) pre-frontal cortex. 
It is notable that when this region is damaged, an excessive level of “present 
bias” is observed. Indeed, in general, human beings seem to reflect a certain 
degree of “present bias”. However, “humans are much closer to time 
consistency and have much longer time horizons than any other species, 
probably by several orders of magnitude” (Gintis 2009, 11). 
There are a number of other systematic biases or contradictions per se 
to rationality of human behavior. Status quo bias, endowment and framing 
bias, and the use of heuristics in decision making. Most of these biases and 
contradictions can be dealt with by building them into the model of human 
preferences. This will be shown at present. 
2.1.1. Prospect Theory 
People tend to view value outcomes differently according to whether they 
involve losses or gains. This might be seen to be complementary to status quo 
bias. According to (Gintis 2009), this suggests an emphasis on change in 
position, rather than on magnitude or “level" of the present position. At face 
value, this seems to contradict rationality, but on closer inspection, it does not 
violate rationality conditions (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) suggest a solution 
to this difficulty. Given that we design our utility function to reflect the above 
emphasis (a bias towards change in position), we can design a function that in 
fact has a higher slope to the side of the graph representing negative gains 
(losses) than the side representing positive gains. In other words, we would 
wind up with a “kinked” function. There is a wide-ranging literature 
confirming the existence of “kinked" functions in a number of animal species, 
especially with regards to time (preferring the present to the past, etc.), so this 
is not so difficult to imagine. 
In fact, numerous experiments confirm the existence of “kinked” utility 
functions in humans. Ultimately, accounting for this, and accounting for 
differences in the magnitude of loss aversion and in “time discounting” should 
go a long way to resolving apparent contradictions between human behavior 
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and conditions of rationality. Similar contradictions with regards to framing, 
endowment and the use of heuristics also turn up similar situations. Including 
parameters in the utility function that reflect such biases seems to eliminate 
most of them in so far as they contradict with rationality. The case of heuristics 
is a bit more complex, but we don't intend to deal with it at length here. For 
more on the role of heuristics in decision making, see (Gintis 2009, 26). 
The same goes for other regarding preferences. Including these in 
individuals’ utility functions should resolve many of the contradictions the 
rationality model faces in these situations. According to the model Homo 
economicus, people should in fact just consider others in so far as doing so 
maximizes their expected material payoffs. In the following chapters, we show 
that this is often times not the case, confirming the limitations of the model 
and the need for alternative models of human behavior. 
2.2. Expected utility maximization in practice 
As pointed out above, failures of the expected utility principle do not equate 
irrationality. We will outline at present why this is the case. Subjects who 
systematically violate the principal of expected utility often display 
preferences that can easily be modeled and incorporated into the rational 
actor model. Time discounting, “present bias” and “folk probability” are all 
examples of this type of violation. Other types result from ignorance of the 
choice set or the payoffs thereof. These two types of violations are, in turn, 
referred to as “systematic” and “non-systematic performance errors”. Like an 
unpracticed opera singer who intends to sing a high-C, but falls off flat, 
performance errors can be dealt with via practice and education. Examples 
include programs to spur prudence and saving in the general populace. 
Irrationality, on the other hand, would entail much deeper 
contradictions of behavior from the precepts outlined above and in Chapter 1. 
Such behavior is rarely found in the animal world, from the simplest 
multicellular organisms to the most complex vertebrae, including human 
beings. 
The two most striking failures of expected utility maximization are the 
Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes. These both describe situations where individual 
behavior systematically deviates from rationality.2 These will be discussed in 
some detail at present. 
2.2.1. Allais paradox 
The Allais paradox, first presented in (Allais 1953), involves a situation in 
which an individual presented with two lotteries makes a choice in both that, 
while individually uncontroversial, reveal a contradiction in utility 
maximization when taken together. This will be shown briefly: if an individual 
                                                             
2 It should be noted that non-systematic deviations from rationality do not conflict 
with the underlying assumptions of the model. 
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is offered the following two lotteries, empirical evidence (see: Machina 1987, 
136 for an overview) suggests that many individuals tend towards choosing 1a 
and 2b.  
 
 Option a Option b 
Lottery 1 50 cents .1*$1+.89*50 cents +.01*$0 
Lottery 2 .11*50 cents + .89*$0 .1*$1+.9*$0 
 
Table 1. Allais Paradox. 
 
Simply calculating the expected utility functions from these two choices shows 
a paradox. This means individuals systematically violate the higher payoff 
loving and transitivity conditions of the rational agent model. Gintis (2009) 
offers two possible explanations for this inconsistency. Firstly, an incorrect 
choice may encourage feelings of regret, thus leading to bending of the 
conditions of utility maximization. Secondly, it is possible that this is an 
example of status quo based loss aversion: an individual may see the “anchor 
point” of the two lotteries as being different, in the one it is 50 cents, in the 
other $0. The differing anchor points might therefore lead to differing beliefs 
about likely outcomes. 
Whatever the correct explanation, this may be more evidence for state-
dependent preferences (discussed in the concluding chapter) than of 
inconsistency. 
2.2.2. Ellsberg paradox 
The Ellsberg paradox describes a different aspect of irrational behavior. 
Individuals are presented the choice of two urns, both filled with red marbles 
and white marbles. The distribution of the first urn is known, whereas the 
second urn's distribution is unknown. Individuals are given the choice to pick 
a marble twice from one of the two runs. Players are given some amount of 
money in the first round for one red marble and none for a white marble, and 
the same amount for one white marble and none for a red marble in the 
second round. Given the knowledge of the color distribution of the first urn, 
utility maximizing individuals would only select one marble from the first urn. 
This can be explained by the idea that, given the knowledge of the first urn's 
color distribution, we assume it has a higher level of red or white marbles, 
respectively. To increase my chances in the second round, I would reflexively 
choose a marble from the urn with less chance of having more of the wrong 
color. If I believed the second urn had more of the wrong color in the second 
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round, then I would have picked a marble from it in the first round, when the 
goals were switched. 
Empirically, however, people tend to choose both marbles out of the 
first urn when the number of each color approaches, but is not equal to, fifty 
percent of the total. Rationality would dictate different behavior. To see this, let 
us assume urn 1 has a distribution of 49 white and 51 red marbles. The 
expected utility of choosing from urn 1 in the first round is .51($1) + .49(0) (if 
$1 were the amount in question). The expected utility of choosing from urn 2 
would be p($1) + (1-p)(0). The choice of a marble from urn 1 would imply that 
p 49. In the second round, many again choose from urn 1, whose expected 
utility is 51(0) + .49($1), and urn 2's expected utility is p(0) + (1-p)($1). 
Choosing from urn 1 would imply that p .49. The above is, of course, logically 
infeasible. Gintis (2009, 18) describes the Ellsberg and the Allais paradoxes as 
a performance errors. Subjects assessing the situation described by the 
Ellsberg paradox may simply assess “known” risk differently than uncertain 
risk. “Of course, with some relatively sophisticated probability theory, we are 
assured that there is in fact no such additional risk” (Gintis 2009, 18). 
2.3. Charitable giving 
Sugden (1982) describes some of the basic contradictions between the 
principle of expected utility maximization and social practice with reference to 
the issue of charity. He finds that theoretical levels of marginal utility derived 
from charitable giving are not congruent with many features of charitable 
giving found in reality. Namely, deriving a model with a few simple 
specifications congruent with the “public-minded” theory of charitable giving 
reveals that, in order to be plausible, individuals would either have to react 
strongly to changes in giving by others to charity (i.e., have a strong discount 
rate for charitable giving with respect to others’ giving), or to approach 100% 
of allocation of additional income to charity (i.e., have a very low income 
elasticity for giving). Both of these outcomes seem highly improbable, given, as 
Sugden (1982) points out, that they imply that individuals would either 
increase their charitable contributions in reaction to lower contributions by 
others, or not spend any amount of additional income on personal 
consumption. 
All of this points to flaws in the theory of expected utility, but one 
shouldn't completely discount it as a viable theory for explaining any aspect of 
human behavior. There is a difference between a theory's failure to provide 
universal insight and its complete irrelevance. A useful undertaking of future 
scholarship will be to determine where the principle of expected utility 
maximization does and does not obtain. 
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3. Nash Equilibrium & the Prisoners' Dilemma 
One of the fundamental concepts of modern economic theory is that of the 
Nash equilibrium. Assume two individuals exhibiting the above conditions of 
Bayesian rationality, who play a game in which the payoffs are as follows: A 
long-standing debate has ensued in the social sciences as to the “dominant” 
strategy for each player in the game. It is true that, were both players to be 
Benthamite hedonists, there would be little possibility for any other strategy 
besides defection. This can be seen by viewing the dominant strategy for 
player 1 if player 2 chooses cooperation. In this case, player 1 would receive 50 
cents by cooperating, yet could expect $1 if s/he were to defect. Therefore, a 
Benthamite hedonist would choose defection. The second player's response to 
this best response would also be to defect, such that the inevitable outcome 
would be that each receives nothing. This is the case because no matter how 
we run our thinking process, a hedonistic, payoff maximizing individual will 
always choose the defect strategy. It forms what has been come to be referred 
to as a Nash equilibrium, which is a stable equilibrium that is arrived at in a 
non-cooperative game (a game without collusion) where both individuals can 
gain nothing by individually switching strategies. 
 
2 \ 1  Cooperate Defect  
Cooperate 50 cents (1,−1) 
Defect (-1,1) 0 
  
 Table 2. Nash equilibrium. 
 
Of course, this interpretation of events is exceedingly misleading, as it is 
unlikely that people behave like Benthamite hedonists in most cases in reality, 
save for a limited number of settings (such as in criminal interrogations). If it 
were to generally obtain, it is arguable that such behavior amounts to 
sociopathy where found, as Gintis (2009) argues. Ethical and moral principles 
ultimately prescribe we behave in certain ways, and we tend to apply these 
pretty strictly, often disregarding material payoffs to uphold moral principles. 
As such, significant deviations were found between actual behavior and that 
prescribed by the Benthamite view, both in field experiments and in the 
laboratory (Henrich et al. 2004). We get into some of these in the following 
chapters. 
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4. Conclusion on rationality 
It would appear that our fundamental discoveries in this chapter have been 
that rationality is a concept often misunderstood in social science research. 
Moreover, the argument has been attempted to be established that including a 
particular model of rationality drawn from microeconomics literature into the 
foundations of modern social theory would greatly benefit the coherence and 
consistency of social science scholarship. Evidence has been offered that 
human beings, like most other animal species, generally follow rational 
behavioral precepts, and where they do not, adequate measures can be taken 
in many instances to reflect systematic deviations from underlying principles 
(such as utility maximization). One conclusion we have hoped to have 
evidenced in the above is that the first underlying premise of the homo 
economicus model, namely utility maximization, is often invalidated in 
practice. This does not, of course, mean that the model is useless or incorrect. 
As has been pointed out above, human beings are in general an order of 
magnitude more consistent in their preferences than other animal species. Yet, 
an understanding of the limitations of a model is important in order to know 
where it does apply. 
Altruistic Preferences 
 
By “social preferences”, we mean certain implicit or explicit desires or 
preferences that do not conform to the expectations of a model based on self-
interest. These behaviors consist of feelings (and the actions they motivate) of 
altruism, fairness, reciprocity and inequality aversion (Fehr & Camerer 2007), 
as well as a general concern for the thoughts of others (Ellingsen & 
Johannesson 2007). We refer to the first type in this paper as “altruistic 
preferences”, and the second as “esteem preferences”. Kropotkin (2012), a 
seminal author in the modern scientific study of human reciprocity, speaks of 
this type of behavior as existing in numerous animal species, including bees: 
These small insects, which so easily might become the prey of so 
many birds, and whose honey has so many admirers in all classes 
of animals from the beetle to the bear, also have none of the 
protective features derived from mimicry or otherwise, without 
which an isolated living insect hardly could escape wholesale 
destruction; and yet, owing to the mutual aid they practice, they 
obtain the wide extension which we know and the intelligence we 
admire, By working in common they multiply their individual 
forces; by re-sorting to a temporary division of labor combined 
with the capacity of each bee to perform every kind of work when 
required, they attain such a degree of well-being and safety as no 
isolated animal can ever expect to achieve however strong or 
well-armed it may be (Kropotkin 2012). 
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Indeed, we will argue presently that one can view this sort of behavior 
in humanity as well, and that the existence of such behavior as a general rule 
runs contrary to the precepts of Benthamite utilitarianism (i.e., that human 
agency consists primarily of self-regarding preferences). If we are in fact 
successful in demonstrating that individuals do not always (or even generally) 
maximize own payoffs instead of holding to some other principle of agency 
(such as rule-based utilitarianism, Kantian de-ontology, etc.), then the case for 
retaining self-regarding preferences as the sin qua non of human social 
preferences is severely weakened. 
Many popular and iconic historical examples of self-sacrifice and other 
deviations from self-regarding preferences exist. One example is the figure of 
Pheidippedes, a courier in ancient Greece who supposedly died after running a 
little more than 42km in order to relay the news of the Battle of Marathon, 
which the Athenians had won. Likewise, one can view the actions of German 
soldiers during the last stages of WWII, who maintained a fortified “corridor” 
for East Prussian civilians to escape as depicting these preferences. Self-
regarding bees, couriers and soldiers in a losing army would not concern 
themselves with the well-being of others insofar as their own personal 
material welfare was unaffected. A self-interested bee would not sacrifice its 
life by discharging its stinger's venom. It would wait for another bee to do this, 
thus “free riding" on that other bee's generosity. A self-interested courier 
would take his or her time informing the Athenians of their military victory. 
Likewise, self-interested soldiers in a losing army would abandon their posts, 
and not worry about any “corridors” for civilians. 
Social preferences are not restricted to bees and couriers and soldiers. 
They are clearly visible in everyday human behavior. They repeatedly occur in 
experimental settings established to measure general strategic interaction3. In 
the following, we will address empirical evidence for the existence of social 
preferences, both in experimental and non-experimental settings. We 
generally follow Ellingsen and Johannesson’s (2007) division into “other 
regarding” and “other's thought regarding” social preferences, and restrict 
our-selves primarily to the first in this chapter, moving to the latter in the 
following one. First, we will attempt to address what, if any, origins social 
preferences have. 
5. Where Social Preferences Come From 
The real origins for social preferences (in human beings) likely lie back in the 
linguistic, biological and cultural origins of Homo sapiens. Certainly, the 
existence of such values would puzzle anyone with a basic understanding of 
natural selection. Darwin himself wrestled with the idea: 
                                                             
3 Though the applicability of such results might be limited (Bowles & Polania-Reyes 
2012, 11). 
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But it may be asked, how within the limits of the same tribe did a 
large number of members first become endowed with these social 
and moral qualities, and how was the standard of excellence 
raised? It is extremely doubtful whether the offspring of the more 
sympathetic and benevolent parents, or of those who were the 
most faithful to their comrades, would be reared in greater 
numbers than the children of selfish and treacherous parents be-
longing to the same tribe. He who was ready to sacrifice his life, 
as many a savage has been, rather than betray his comrades, 
would often leave no offspring to inherit his noble nature. The 
bravest men, who were always willing to come to the front in war, 
and who freely risked their lives for others, would on an average 
perish in larger numbers than other men. Therefore, it hardly 
seems probable that the number of men gifted with such virtues, 
or that the standard of their excellence, could be increased 
through natural selection, that is, by the survival of the fittest; for 
we are not here speaking of one tribe being victorious over 
another (Darwin 2004). 
Inadvertently, Darwin may have stumbled upon the answer. The problem, it 
seems, may lay in the fact of attempting to distinguish inter and intragroup 
advantages, whereas the influence may be quite significant, from one to the 
other. And, thus, Darwin continued later: 
It must not be forgotten that although a high standard of morality 
gives but a slight or no advantage to each individual man and his 
children over the other men of the same tribe, yet that an 
increase in the number of well-endowed men and an 
advancement in the standard of morality will certainly give an 
immense advantage to one tribe over another. A tribe including 
many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit 
of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were 
always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves for 
the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; 
and this would be natural selection. At all times throughout the 
world tribes have supplanted other tribes; and as morality is one 
important element in their success, the standard of morality and 
the number of well-endowed men will thus everywhere tend to 
rise and increase (Darwin 2004). 
This circumstance – low individual fitness but high social or “deme” fitness – 
as a prerequisite to the evolution of altruism is famously captured by taking 
Hamilton's formula for inclusive fitness, which states the precondition for the 
evolution of altruism as consisting of higher benefits than costs to the 
behavior in question, and taking a sum over a population. Axiomatically, the 
formula reads 
rb > c 
where r is the relatedness of the individual upon whom one is conferring a 
benefit, b is the level of benefit of the action to the individual and c is the cost 
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to the individual carrying out the action. This means that summing the 
formula for i groups of j individuals would entail 
rbk6=j > ci;j 
It is easy to see that, according to the formula, the ability for altruistic behavior 
to develop and evolve would necessarily be limited to societies with a high 
level of relatedness, and would even there be quite limited to actions that 
confer extraordinary benefit to the recipient when measured with respect to 
the costs accrued. We will return to this issue momentarily. To illustrate, let us 
take a relatively high level of median relatedness, .2, and a benefit to cost ratio 
of .2, and a benefit to cost ratio of 5 to 1 has to occur for altruism to be able to 
spread. 
It is important, it would appear, to devise a thorough and exhaustive 
view of the origins of altruism, and merely stating that it depended on close-
knit communities does not seem to capture the sensitivity of altruism to 
outside conditions. Although, as Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) discuss, there 
may be certain stability conditions that allow a certain gene-cultural mix to 
persevere in the face of “invading" types, it is likely ulterior factors are at play 
in maintaining altruism as a viable behavioral type. The mechanism by which 
these factors are relevant for economic discourse, in that the existence of 
markets and modern states requires a large degree of trust and reciprocation 
among citizenry. This makes a nuanced view of the evolution and maintenance 
of reciprocal altruism (altruistic behavior that results from the expectation 
that it may be reciprocated in the future) quite central to modern economic 
theory, writ large. 
5.1. Cosmopolitan ancestors 
Indeed, the premise that our ancestors lived in close-knit groups appears quite 
suspect. Moreno-Ga mez et al. (2009) discuss the potential for the existence of 
cosmopolitan ancestors. There is considerable evidence for this theory. The 
archaeological record Ambrose (1998), for instance, speaks for significantly 
less genetic diversity than the parochial, close-knit communities individuals 
certain biologists, like Dawkins, assume to have preceded modern man would 
in fact possess. Additionally, ethnographic study of contemporary “pre-
contact” societies4 reveals a high degree of continual and consistent contact 
with outside groups (trade and warfare5). Indeed, the high degree of conflict 
(Bowles & Gintis 2011, 102)6 and the extreme level of climatological volatility 
                                                             
4 See Salzano et al. (1977) for a seminal study in the field; Lins et al. (2010) and Henn 
et al. (2011) are more a more recent studies making similar claims. 
5 In fact, migration and trading of individuals between groups seems to be quite 
frequent among such societies. 
6 Indeed, there is a good argument that warfare likely strongly contributed to the 
evolutionary stability of altruism, via parochial altruism, which we don't mean to 
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that accompanied the late Pleistocene (Andersen et al. 2004) would have 
necessitated frequent and sometimes extreme levels of migration and 
interaction. 
On a more abstract level, when a number of repeated generation 
computer simulations were run, it was shown that even mild levels of 
perceptual error, that is, error in interpreting behavior and relatively 
innocuous cost-benefit ratios (Hamilton) reduced quite extraordinarily the 
upper limit of group members allowing for altruistic behavior to develop. Even 
for a relatively low perceptual error rate of 2%, maximum group size where 
altruistic behavior forms a dominant equilibrium ranged from 2-8, much 
smaller than the size we understand groups to have consisted of in the late 
Pleistocene/Early Holocene, which was likely closer to 80 (Moreno-Ga mez et 
al. 2009). Another explanation for the development of altruistic behavior is 
therefore necessary. 
5.2. Multi-level selection 
The theory Wilson and Sober (1994) advance to further explain for the 
proliferation of altruism in society in general introduces the notion of payoff 
differences among groups (“demes”) and the evolutionary (dis)advantages 
that these differences may involve. According to this process, groups or demes 
that display certain traits are more likely to sur-vive than those that do not. In 
effect, members of these groups have an evolutionary advantage over 
members of other groups. This is the case even though individual members of 
the deme who have the trait are at an evolutionary disadvantage. This process 
is referred to as “multi-level selection”, meaning that the evolutionary process 
occurs on both the inter and intragroup levels. 
According to the theory of Wilson and Sober (1994), three conditions 
are required in order for altruism to be considered an evolutionarily stable 
trait despite the theory of inclusive fitness: 1) that group life is essential to 
human survival, 2) that successful groups tend to destroy and/or absorb less 
successful groups, and 3) that groups containing higher levels of altruists tend 
to cooperate more and that cooperative groups tend to persevere in the case of 
frequent inter-group conflict (and, by extension, to survive the severe 
environmental crises that characterized early human civilization). Certainly, to 
validate this theory one would have to find evidence of such multi-level 
selection in practice. This is what Bowles and Gintis (2011) in fact attempt to 
do. Their theory contradicts what has been a dominant position in the social 
sciences for decades at least. 
Bowles’ and Gintis’ (2011) theory consists of a number of co-
evolutionary processes that may have contributed to the evolution of altruistic 
behavior. These will be outlined in the following. 
                                                                                                                                                           
address at present, but which provides a very compelling assessment of the facilitator 
of the evolution of cooperation and altruism. 
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5.3. Selective extinction 
The process of selective extinction consists in the advantage over and against 
other groups that a group possessing a certain trait might have. In terms of 
social preferences, while the social individual may incur a selective loss in 
comparison with the less socially inclined, there may in fact be a between-
group advantage for groups featuring socially inclined individuals. This might 
be the case in case of frequent or severe inclement conditions or frequent 
inter-group conflict. 
(𝑃)𝑗
𝑃𝑖𝑗
≠  
𝑖
𝐺
 
We can represent this effect by the inequality where (P)j is the variance of 
population within one group or deme with respect to the trait in question, Pij is 
the inter-group population variance with respect to the trait, i is the individual 
cost of switching from not having to having the trait and G is the change in the 
level of fitness of the j trait in any group with respect to a shift in the number 
of individuals displaying that trait. Being that we are concerned here with 
social preferences, of which altruism is the most iconic, we will assume that 
the parameter i is negative, and G positive. 
In order for selective extinction to bestow a particular trait with an 
evolutionary advantage, this inequality has to hold. The inequality would hold 
when there is a large intergroup diversity in types (e.g., when there are many 
different levels of cooperation be-tween groups) and/or when within-group 
variance is very low (e.g., when there are groups of homogeneous altruists and 
others of homogeneous sociopaths). As such, a trait like cooperation can 
spread by increasing the fitness of groups possessing it, so that, in practice, 
inter-group conflict leaves these groups with a higher chance of success, thus 
passing on the trait to further generations (and, in effect, spreading by 
colonizing or subjugating groups with a greater likelihood that do not feature 
the trait7. It in effect works on G. 
5.4. Reproductive leveling 
Reproductive leveling consists of measures which in fact reduce the payoff 
difference between traits. They, in turn, are comprised of conventions that are 
in every group member's interest to uphold, as long as others uphold them. As 
such, they are an example of reciprocal altruism. As an example, a trait like the 
sharing of food or land redistribution has obvious evolutionary disadvantages 
to the individual, as property belonging to individuals is withdrawn without 
direct material compensation. However, if benefits of this type of behavior for 
the group are randomly distributed within the group, and groups endowed 
with a high number of individuals who share food have a selective advantage 
                                                             
7 Bowles and Gintis (2011) cite this as a potential reason for the spread of European 
culture in the last five centuries. 
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over groups that do not, then these two facts themselves spell out two distinct 
effects that reduce the former disadvantage. The first includes the term 𝑛𝑏, 
where n is the group size, representing the possibility of any altruistic 
individual benefiting from his or her own altruistic behavior. The second is a 
bit more complex. It involves estimating the total effect of the switch from not 
having the trait to having the trait, and not simply viewing this switch in 
isolation, where the effect is only represented by a cost parameter, c. 
Ultimately, the effect of switching from not having to having the trait, i 
described above, can be generally represented by the following equation, 
taken from Bowles and Gintis (2011, 118): 
𝑖 =
𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑗
 
where dwij is the reproductive fitness of members with trait j in group i, and 
the term in the denominator on the left-hand side is the fraction of deme i who 
have the altruism trait. The dwij is, in turn, equal to: 
𝑐 + 𝑏 + 
𝜅
𝜆𝐴
 
where the first term represents the first effect discussed, and the last term the 
second effect. κ is a sort of “violence” or “volatility parameter”; λA is the 
change in group survival chances with respect to a change in the percentage of 
members displaying altruistic behavior. If a particular group engages in 
reproductive leveling conventions, these clearly reduce the cost to the 
individual of engaging in altruistic behavior. The above equation becomes: 
𝜏𝑟𝑐 + 𝑏 + 
𝜅
𝜆𝐴
 
where τr is the extent of reproductive leveling. The equation represents the 
fact that, in the presence of reproductive leveling, the cost of altruistic 
behavior is a declining function in the percentage of group members engaging 
in reproductive leveling. 
5.5. Selective assortment 
If we assume that the distribution of altruism is not random, then it is 
imaginable that some level of self-selection occurs with respect to this 
parameter. Self-selection and migrational patterns might then theoretically 
lead to a distribution where a large number of homogeneous altruist and 
sociopath communities exist. This behavior is referred in the literature to as 
“selective assortment” (Bowles & Gintis 2011, 122), and could certainly 
contribute to a stable equilibrium where altruistic traits spread, via the above 
detailed effects contributing to selectional advantage. 
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6. Genetic & Cultural Evolution of Altruism 
Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) suggest that social preferences likely 
originate to a great extent from social contexts such as parental influence, 
religious and community affiliation, socialization and on a number of other 
exogenous factors (what Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) refer to as 
“baseline values”). Additionally, they argue, certain preferences are 
endogenous, a sort of preference which Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) 
explain as a type of long-term “preference updating”, featuring elements of 
persistence beyond the short term8. 
There are likely also neurological bases. Fehr and Camerer (2007) 
report activation of the ventral striatum (in communication with a human 
cooperator, as well as in correlation with offers perceived as “fair” in 
experimental settings), dorsal striatum (in punishing defectors in Prisoner 
Dilemma games), nucleus accumbens and the orbitofrontal cortex (in men in 
accompanying punishment of unfair partners), ventral tegmental (in response 
to either receipt of monetary reward or the act of donating to charity9. Most of 
these areas of the brain are specifically involved with processing reward, and 
are interestingly often activated both when giving and receiving (in 
experimental settings) endowments. 
Likewise, a number of areas of the brain implicated in both reward, 
motivation and executive functions have been found to activate in situations 
where social preferences are likely active. Activation in the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (PFC), (in situations of punishment for behavior perceived as 
“unfair”) in the dorsolateral PFC, the anterior insula and the anterior cingulate 
cortex (in the rejection of low offers). All of these areas of the brain are 
involved variously in risk assessment, reward and motivation, pleasure, fear, 
stress and conflict resolution and are likely implicated in parsing conflicts 
between social preferences and self-interest, as Fehr and Camerer (2007) 
suggest. 
7. The Issue of Free Riding 
Institutions that rely on a great deal of social preferences, such as shrimp 
fishing, jury deliberations, taxation and countless others, rely to a greater or 
lesser extent on compliance. In some cases, such as taxation, it may be more or 
less possible to make credible threats to the effect that noncompliance is tied 
                                                             
8 Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) describe the endogeneity by referring to the 
authors’ residence in Italy as potentially affecting long-term food preferences: “It 
might be that we have newly come to enjoy the taste of pasta, perhaps through 
extensive exposure to it while in Italy.” This would be an example of “preference 
updating” tantamount to preference endogeneity. 
9 Apparently more generous giving was correlated with higher activity in this region, 
suggesting that “giving has its own reward” (Fehr & Camerer 2007, 422). 
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to severe repercussions, but in other cases few such mechanisms exist (or 
where they do they are ineffective). In such cases, we are said to face the 
problem of free riding. Free riding consists of all incidents where public (non-
excludable, non-rivalrous) goods are used without proper (pecuniary or non-
pecuniary) compensation. 
The problem of preventing, eliminating and punishing free-riding is a 
serious one, and one which the present work is not extensive or involved 
enough to deal with in its entirety. We will suffice ourselves with mentioning 
at present a few examples where free riding might occur in order to provide a 
general picture, and return to the issue in a future section. Fehr and 
Leibbrandt (2011) discuss a clear case where free-riding presents a real 
problem. They studied two groups of Brazilian shrimp fishermen. There is a 
convention among shrimp fishermen to cut holes in the traps. If holes are too 
small, not enough young shrimp escape in order to repopulate the depleted 
areas. 
It is easy to see that each individual fisherman has an incentive to cut 
small holes as long as everyone else is abiding by the convention. This is an 
obvious example of a free riding problem. The same case holds for paying 
taxes and a large number of other behaviors where private and public utility 
are not congruent. 
8. Other-Regarding Preferences in Practice 
We see many examples of other regarding preferences in practice. A few we 
will address in more detail in the next section, but it may be worth noting 
certain practical examples of the first type of social preference at present. 
Definitive evidence of social preferences was found in a so-called gift game, 
wherein principals played the role of employers, and agents those of 
employees. In the version of the game conducted by Fehr et al. (1998), 
significant deviations from self-regarding utility maximizing behavior were 
recorded, both on the side of “employers” and “employees”. Additionally, 
numerous trials with ultima-tum games reveal distinct deviations from the 
behavior prescribed by the Homo economicus model. Camerer and Thaler 
(1995) found significant evidence of “manners” in decisions in both 
determining and accepting (or not accepting) distributions of the initial 
endowment in the game. Offers were typically significantly more than the 
minimum allowable (the average was around 50%), and positive offers were 
frequently rejected when considered “low” or “unjust”. Other ultimatum 
experiments confirm these findings (see, for instance, Oosterbeek et al. (2004) 
for a meta-study). 
Differently from the ultimatum game, there is no ability to reject offers 
in the dictator game. This means the esteem effects discussed below play no 
role in such cases. Nevertheless, significantly positive distributions are the rule 
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here, in general. In experiments conducted by Andreoni and Miller (2002), the 
average distribution of the endowment was more than 25%, far above the 0% 
hedonistic utility maximization would prescribe. We can expect that the 
difference in distributions between ultimatum (50%) and dictator (25%) 
games to be attributed to some form of “reputation” or esteem valuation, or to 
fear of rejection. We will discuss this in more detail below. 
9. Conclusion 
In this chapter, it has been our goal to show that another element of the Homo 
economicus model, self-regarding preferences, is deeply flawed. Human beings 
do, in fact, possess certain social preferences that include a regard for others 
that has both an economic, as well as a moral character. The economic 
character includes the efficiency which other regarding beliefs and behavior 
facilitate, as well as the implications of certain “social resources” such as 
esteem on behavior. The moral dimension stems from a heuristic or rule that 
certain communities abide by that in fact is unable to be adequately 
represented in the standard utility function. “We are nice because we are nice 
people.” 
Moreover, we have summarized some of the main findings of biology, 
anthropology and archeology as they relate to the development and evolution 
of social preferences, including outlining some mechanisms by which altruism 
came about, such as multi-level selection and co-evolution. We have outlined 
some of the main pitfalls to social preferences, including free riding and the 
seeming paradox of charitable giving. In the following chapter, we will widen 
the scope of our analysis to include esteem and the general consideration of 
“the thoughts of others” as they influence our own preferences. 
Esteem Preferences 
 
The following chapter will outline the relevance of esteem preferences for 
economics research. Esteem preferences can loosely be understood to refer to 
preferences regarding “what others think”, following Ellingsen and 
Johannesson (2007). We first assess what the origins of esteem are, and 
address what it is (and therefore is not), and follow this with a discussion of 
the hedonistic paradox, a circumstance that obfuscates esteem from working 
like a traditional good. We then outline a possible economy of esteem, 
following Brennan and Pettit (2004), and then describe several problems 
facing it. 
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10. Origins & Characteristics of Esteem 
Esteem is a word rich with many meanings. As such, it holds to Nietzsche's 
claim that “words are like pockets: they hold now one thing, now another”. 
Esteem should be seen as a sentiment of approbation felt towards a particular 
individual. In common usage, one speaks of both “self-esteem” and the esteem 
of others, what is referred to as “social esteem”. The latter is the core concern 
of the economic study of esteem, though as Brennan and Pettit (2004, 16) 
argue, the two are closely correlated. Though this connection is of more than 
precursory significance, we do not intend to expound on it here. 
The origins of esteem are of recent interest in the psychological and 
sociological literature. Indeed, the entire field of moral epistemology has 
arisen in recent years, wherein a chief aim is to discover why it is collectives 
develop a sense of good and bad behavior, and how these are engendered in 
individual agents. Certainly, esteem alone would be a poor answer as to the 
'what’ of human morality, or even its ends, but it is likely a good starting point 
– and perhaps a good model for capturing – the 'how’ of how seemingly 
unlikely developments in behavior and morality occur and spread throughout 
populations. 
We have already discussed in the last chapter how activities which 
themselves have no or even negative utility payoffs for individuals can 
potentially benefit the group as a whole, thereby potentially having desirable 
social outcomes that outweigh the costs to the individual of performing the 
action. The question of the motor or facilitator of the spread of these types of 
behavior could potentially be addressed by the existence of esteem. For 
example, the effectiveness of gossip at eliciting socially desirable behavior is 
itself likely the result of the evolutionary advantage of having a “gossip 
receptor”, broadly seen. For theoretical and empirical data on the origins of 
morality (and, by extension, of esteem), see, inter alia, Kurzban and Leary 
(2001), Kurzban and Houser (2005) and De Waal (1996). 
Brennan and Pettit (2004, 2-15) describe esteem as being an 
attitudinal good, which are “goods (...) that come into being by virtue of what 
people think and feel about the person esteemed: that is, by virtue of their 
attitudes rather than their actions.” However, esteem is not merely an 
attitudinal good. It consists as well of evaluative components, i.e., judging or 
“ranking” individuals according to either carrying out – or carrying out to a 
certain extent – an action. In addition to this, esteem also comprises 
comparative components, i.e., the placing into a specific context – for instance, 
that of average and ideal performances – of estimable actions. For instance, I 
cannot disesteem a plumber for his poor pedagogical skills when comparing 
him with a high school teacher, but I can esteem one teacher more than 
another, for the reason that their career aspirations as teachers should be 
fairly similar: i.e., they are comparable. Giving one teacher a higher level of 
esteem naturally eliminates the ability to esteem at this level of esteem all 
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teachers who perform at less than this level. Finally, esteem consists of 
directive components, i.e., being directed at actions in particular, and generally 
those with regard to which the individual being judged has some degree of 
self-control. I don't esteem someone in total, but in so far as they engage in 
activities deemed estimable. 
11. The Hedonistic Paradox 
The attitudinal quality of esteem is further colored by the fact that, given that 
esteem is a good, it is not a “normal” good: it cannot be given as a gift or traded 
voluntarily, there-fore one cannot let off or eliminate “excess esteem” (pardon 
the pun) by supplying it via an external market, and so on [Brennan & Pettit 
2004, 51). A voluntarist quality of esteem is, in fact, virtually non-existent, 
according to Brennan and Pettit (2004), although this supposition has been 
called into question by at least one author10. If the sup-position holds, this 
means that I cannot freely (cf. arbitrarily) confer esteem upon others. 
Ultimately, these attitudinal dispositions are given, to a large extent, 
exogenously: “we cannot help but be sources of light or gloom in [the] lives [of 
those whom we esteem or disesteem]” (Brennan & Pettit 2004, 54). This, 
combined with the fact that the active seeking of esteem usually results in the 
opposite reaction (namely, disesteem), creates a problem which in philosophy 
is referred to as the “hedonistic paradox” or what Brennan & Pettit refer to as 
the “teleological paradox”: like pleasure or fear or any number of attitudinal 
goods (bads), one cannot offer or receive esteem directly11. 
To illustrate this, take the example of pleasure. In most cases, it is true 
that one receives pleasure from doing something pleasurable. Pleasure is then 
an indirect consequence (a payoff) of engaging in the activity. This is easy to 
imagine. Picture the person smiling and laughing while eating an ice cream 
cone with a friend on the ledge of a canal on a sunny day in summer. The 
pleasure in this case is derivative of eating the ice cream, being with the friend, 
and enjoying a sunny summer's day. Seeking pleasure per se (plaisir pour la 
plaisir) is more difficult to imagine: “It is incoherent to think of making 
spontaneity a targeted goal: spontaneity consists precisely in not having such 
a self-focused aim” (Brennan & Pettit 2004, 36). 
The same thing that obtains for pleasure or spontaneity is arguably 
also the case for esteem. Demanding esteem directly is a contradiction in 
terms as demanding spontaneity or pleasure is one. Not only is this a 
contradiction in terms, it is also likely self-defeating. The reasoning behind this 
is clear: someone who plays a virtuoso piece merely for the purpose of 
impressing an audience reduces or even eliminates the esteem he may have 
                                                             
10 See Cowen's review of Brennan and Pettit's book (Cowen 2005). 
11 For the problem of “open demand” of esteem, see (Brennan & Pettit 2004, 36), for 
the case of supply, see (Brennan & Pettit 2004, 58). 
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accrued, as soon as his true intent is revealed. However, on the other hand, 
little or no publicity removes the ability for the individual to have his/her 
behavior esteemed in the first place. 
Ultimately, these conditions mean that esteem works at first sight like a 
scarce good in an economy, though not a normal one, by any measure. The 
paradox we've just outlined ensures that the economic exchange of esteem 
must find more indirect means in order for flows to occur in any direction. We 
outline these means at present. 
12. An Economy of Esteem? 
If esteem is to be studied in the domain of economics, it first must be 
established if and how it fits within the strictures of the discipline12. As 
Brennan and Pettit (2004, 2) state, “Economies are systems whereby scarce 
resources are allocated among competing parties”. They continue: “In 
particular, they are systems of allocation that have an interactive or 
aggregative dimension. What individual agents do, gives rise to aggregate 
patterns that feed back in turn into the things that determine what individual 
agents do”. It seems, then, that the requirements of analyzing esteem within 
the economics discipline are that one or more of the following holds: Esteem is 
a scarce resource; it is allocated among competing parties; and it has an 
interactive and an aggregative dimension. We have already shown that the first 
is the case. When I give esteem to one individual, I automatically forgo giving 
an equal level of esteem to all other individuals belonging (by my judgment) to 
the same category performing at inferior levels to this person. The second 
condition obtains from the fact that the first condition obtains and from the 
fact that esteem is desirable. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the first two 
conditions obtaining without the third also holding true. We will talk more 
about the aggregative components of esteem when we discuss esteem 
associations. 
For there to be an economy of esteem, furthermore, there must be both 
a demand and a supply of esteem. We turn to these issues next. 
12.1. The demand for esteem 
The demand for esteem works around the impasse created by the paradox 
outlined above by retreating from the grand boulevards and wide avenues of 
active demand” (like the demand for expensive watches from renowned Paris 
boutiques), and settling in the subterranean depths of virtual 
demand (Brennan & Pettit 2004, 40). Although esteem acts as an underlying 
motivating factor at these depths, it does so only indirectly, via intermediary 
                                                             
12 It is likely that even if there is no direct or explicit way to model esteem in economic 
terms, the ability for discourse to ensue may still be possible, a la Posner's “law & 
economics”. 
Jerome Nikolai Warren 
 
125 
 
wants and desires. We can view this situation analytically by considering the 
following: imagine an individual with a demand for xi different goods of the 
sort ∑ xi. We imagine further that the demand for x1 cannot be fulfilled directly, 
but only via a secondary good, of the sort x1+i. If the particular good, say x2, 
does not accomplish the desired effect of increasing esteem, the individual 
attempting to maximize his or her own esteem selects another activity of the 
sort x2+i. As a practical example: if the (indirect) desire for esteem causes one 
to take up playing basketball, the inability to succeed at this latter task may 
cause one to develop a demand for learning chess. The latter demand, while to 
a certain extent autonomous, is nevertheless called into existence by the fact of 
the failure of basketball as contributing to an acquisition of esteem. The 
demand for esteem is generally one that can be included in utility functions in 
this indirect way. 
12.2. The supply of esteem: Esteem services 
Brennan and Pettit (2004, 56) state that the primary means of regulating or 
“meeting” the virtual demand for esteem are so-called esteem services. These 
are actions that largely serve as proxies for the allocation of esteem. Brennan 
and Pettit (2004) describe three main categories of esteem services: attention, 
testimony and association. Attention is a prerequisite for the supply of esteem. 
Attention is also a scarce resource, so (in this con-text) it also falls under the 
rubric of an economic good. In many instances, attention may itself lend a 
form of esteem, as the famed “Hawthorne effect” suggests. 
Testimony consists of publicly making certain statements regarding 
the beliefs of one individual for another, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
esteem effects for the affected individual. This works also in reverse: the 
refusal to state negative views of what is viewed as a poor performance can 
also be seen as an esteem service, by mitigating disesteem. Association 
consists in the proximity with which one is seen with the individual in 
question. Esteem associations, which we discuss shortly, can serve the role of 
facilitating this (but also the fulfillment of the other services mentioned 
above). Each of these services can work in either direction: esteem as well as 
disesteem can be facilitated via esteem services. 
12.3. The intangible hand 
No discussion of the economy of esteem is complete without mentioning the 
intangible hand. Like Adam Smith's invisible hand of the market for goods, and 
Weber's iron hand of state power, the intangible hand deals in ways that are 
not immediately tangible to achieve some end that is neither intended nor 
planned by parties involved. Different from Smith's invisible hand, however, 
the intangible hand deals primarily with attitudes. Indeed, it has in many ways 
the potential to shape and influence how individual agents act and react in 
certain situations, even influencing the functioning of markets and state 
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power. In a nut-shell, the intangible hand can be understood as follows: if the 
above outlined economy of esteem exists, then people's natural desire for 
esteem will lead them to behave in ways that are conducive to impressing the 
suppliers of esteem in ways that cause desirable out-comes for all individuals 
involved. 
It is important to note that all of this occurs before any regulation or 
impositions by government or other third parties. As we will point out in the 
following chapter, it is possible that incentives and mechanisms are put into 
place that alter what is perceived to be “good” or “normal behavior” in certain 
circumstances. This can work in several directions, as will be pointed out. A 
few examples include so-called “broken-windows" policies and policies to fine 
littering. Used correctly, such institutions can achieve socially desirable 
outcomes. But the potential exists to misuse them and to undermine the 
desired ends. 
13. Esteem Associations 
One way to organize the allocation of esteem services are so-called “esteem 
associations”, which are institutions that organize the allocation of esteem in a 
dimension of shared interest or competence. A professional association or a 
trade union are examples of esteem associations. Esteem associations work 
using a number of means in order to accommodate the desire for esteem of all 
their members. Of course, granted that esteem is a scarce good, the association 
must coordinate several ethical problems, such as whether certain members 
are more deserving of esteem than others, or whether esteem should be 
distributed relatively evenly throughout the organization, and others. 
One of the main tools that most esteem associations have to their 
disposal is the fact that they are voluntary in nature. This means that members 
have the right of exit, and the association, moreover, has the right of expelling 
members under certain circumstances. Indeed, part of the repute that many 
such organizations have stems directly from the selective nature membership 
entails. Ivy League colleges are an example of this, where no doubt the highly 
selective nature of the school plays at least some role in propping up the 
reputation of the school, regardless of the nature of the education offered. We 
will ad-dress in the following section what implications removing this right 
has on the workings of esteem associations. We will see that some of the 
outcomes of the situation are quite interesting. 
13.1. Involuntary associations 
The right of exit is an important one. Without the ability for members to 
voluntarily leave a group (exit right), or for group members to collectively 
expel members (expulsion right), the group loses many of the advantages 
which esteem associations are endowed with. What results is referred to in the 
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literature as an involuntary association. Negro baseball leagues were an 
example of one type of involuntary-association. This is the case because all 
good black baseball players were necessarily relegated to them, as they had no 
re-course to the (white) major leagues. 
Thus, entry into the group was only loosely of a voluntary nature. As 
players were unable to leave the leagues while still retaining their professions 
as baseball players (no outside option), exit was restricted, if not rendered 
impossible. These are relatively typical features of involuntary associations. 
This certainly has an implication on the association and its members to glean a 
certain level of esteem. Among these are greater volatility in welfare and lower 
mean levels of esteem (a good player in the black leagues is not a good player, 
per se; he is a good black player, etc.). 
Probably the best example of an involuntary association is the state of 
unemployment. Members of the “Reserve Army of Labor”, if we term the club 
such, have absolutely no control of their membership into a class of individuals 
that is both despised and relegated to a subordinate role viz. the rest of society, 
a situation mostly of no doing of their own (hence the involuntary character of 
entry). As exit is determined by the successful match of employee and 
employer – a process of some arbitrariness and chance – exit is also, at the 
limit, involuntary. One would therefore expect to see many of the negative 
aspects of involuntary associations among the unemployed. Indeed, one does 
see much more arbitrary shifts in the welfare of the unemployed than in 
employed circles. 
For a quick example, Munsch (2003) discusses a set of programs 
within the state of Saxony in Germany wherein benefits to the aged and 
unemployed are cut, and a percent-age (less than 100%) could be redeemed 
by working in – to all intents and purposes – less than desirable forms of 
occupation. Collective bargaining and the strictures of the labor market would 
likely prevent anything similar from occurring on a systematic basis to the 
employed. 
13.2. Overlapping esteem associations 
Another pertinent issue with regards to the institution of esteem associations 
is the case of esteem associations with overlapping purviews or boundaries. 
Where this is the case, certain defining qualities are shared among several 
independent groups. One example of this might be a national Psychiatric and 
Psychological trade group in any country. Both of these groups consist of 
members who claim to be knowledgeable about the workings of human 
mental faculties, and yet their expertise are disciplinarily distinct and 
therefore entail scruples, knowledge bases, routines and perhaps even rituals 
that vary between the two groupings. It will be our argument going forward 
that the existence of such overlaps entails both desirable and undesirable 
effects. 
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13.2.1. Desirable effects of overlapping boundaries of esteem associations 
In many cases where the boundaries of esteem associations overlap, there may 
be actual benefits to be gleaned. For instance, a recent literature has sprung up 
around the Cuban baseball leagues, which in fact arose out of necessity as a 
result of the U.S. imposed embargo against Cuba since 1961. The embargo may 
disappear as a phenomenon someday, when and if Cuba-American bilateral 
relations normalize. It wouldn't be hard to argue that Cuban baseball has 
developed a distinctive flair and culture, despite the hardships the embargo 
has imposed on the island. 
Remaining in the Caribbean, we can interpret the localized 
development of a distinctive musical tradition – whether it be Afro-Cuban jazz 
or reggae – in a similar manner. The overlaps in these areas certainly point to 
the fallacy of pointing to “economies of scale” or similar benefits in the case of 
dealing with overlapping competences, as these would be achieved at the cost 
of eliminating the particular flair, sound and feel of Caribbean music as seen 
vier and against standardized popular music or even Caribbean music's more 
popular neighbor from New Orleans. 
13.2.2. Undesirable consequences of overlapping boundaries of esteem 
associations 
There are also, of course, undesirable consequences to esteem associations 
whose area of competence overlap. One of these is a tendency for such 
overlapping competences to lead to segmentation, overspecialization and 
eventually even polarization among members of the respective associations. 
Brennan and Pettit (2004) discuss this with reference to the fact that at the 
limit of such a movement, disesteem from one competing association may 
actually equate to esteem in another group, due to the level of polarization of 
the constituents. An example of this can be seen in the cable news industry, 
where a hypostatization of advertisers, producers, commentators and 
ultimately viewers leads to an outcome that is obviously undesirable. 
A reason such situations should be regarded as undesirable is that 
such internecine competition leads to an abundance of wasted effort. If we 
imagine the national Psychological and Psychiatric associations – going back 
to our earlier example – to be engaging in a similar struggle as the cable news 
industry, then more energy would potentially be ex-pended on discrediting the 
other science than, say, in curing and treating chronic mental illness.13 
Certainly, where possible, Afro-Cuban jazz-style overlaps should be 
encouraged, and cable-news-like overlaps discouraged, precisely for this 
reason. 
                                                             
13 It is even possible that such controversies do occur within the medical professional, 
for instance between the mainstream and “alternative medicine” advocates, or 
between the former and homeopathy, inter alia. 
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14. Publicity 
Publicity facilitates the supply and demand of esteem, if we continue to view it 
in an economic sense. It presents the public with the behavior that needs to be 
evaluated, either by feelings of esteem or disesteem. As such it comprises one 
or more or of the esteem services described above. The absence of publicity 
can likewise inhibit the working of esteem, leading to a situation referred 
broadly as pluralistic ignorance. A great example of this is a set of experiments 
conducted by Prentice and Miller (1993). It was determined that the tolerance 
for alcohol consumption was negatively influenced by the knowledge of the 
preferences of others. It appears that individuals change their preferences, 
adapting to (what they falsely believe to be) outside conditions without 
explicit knowledge that other students are more dismissive of alcohol 
consumption than (falsely) assumed. Additionally, an experiment conducted in 
a female restroom in a college library determined that the number of 
individuals maintaining the hand-washing norm more than doubled with a 
second person present (Munger & Harris 1989). This goes to show that the 
publicity, which is inextricably tied to esteem, has a significant effect on 
shaping behavior. 
Empirical evidence points to changes in behavior (e.g., increases in 
cooperation in “one-shot” public goods games) in the case of non-material 
“punishment” in terms of “negative reputation points” and gossip in 
experimental settings (Barr 2001). It could be argued that publicity in such 
cases communicates disdain for a particular behavior, facilitates 
communication of those norms and thereby promoting self-corrective 
behavior in future interactions. Interestingly enough, all of this occurs without 
constraining material pay-off, giving some credence to the idea that non-
material punishment is an effective tool at eliciting pro-social behavioral 
responses. 
One can argue, furthermore, that non-material punishment or publicity 
punishment solves the informational problem inherent in anonymous 
interaction, where the determination of defectors as well as appropriate 
behavior sometimes remains muddled in uncertainty and risk. A good example 
of this might be the “positive” and “negative” feed-back system on auction sites 
like eBay (Resnick et al. 2006). Indeed, negative esteem is a central part of 
what contributes to the tenability of cooperation in many societies. In general, 
empirical investigations made by Fehr and Ga chter (2002) reveal that 
cooperation is more difficult to sustain in the absence of punishment. 
Certainly, negative esteem is one central component of punishment. Going 
back to our earlier discussion of the origins of esteem in human society, one 
can imagine that in situations where gossip and other forms of non-material 
reproach are not possible (impossible to interact with the “esteem receptor”) 
the ability for esteem effects to elicit desirable outcomes will be somewhat 
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subdued. Ultimately, where such cases systematically arise, changes to 
institutions that con-tribute to these poor outcomes might be desirable. 
15. Problems and Pitfalls of Esteem 
15.1. Pitfalls of publicity 
A clear signal that esteem has aggregative or interactive aspects is that when 
individual behavior deviates significantly from the norm, or when the 
standard deviation from the mean is very high (that is, many individuals are 
deviating from the prescribed behavior or compliance is inconsistent 
throughout the population), non-material publicity might actually be 
counterproductive. Brennan and Pettit (2004) discuss this predicament with 
reference to “the light of publicity”. In fact, the “light” may not always reveal a 
reality congruent with expectations, as there is no guarantee that perceived 
compliance is always lower than actual compliance. In fact, if the opposite is 
true, a tax authority, say, would have an incentive to keep true compliance a 
secret. On the other hand, restraint and silence might encourage the type of 
behavior one is attempting to thwart: “A widespread practice of averting one's 
gaze in the face of shameful behavior blunts that incentive” (Brennan & Pettit 
2004, 171). These are all issues that must be considered in a policy context 
and on more practical levels as well. 
Brennan and Pettit (2004) describe a situation in which the 
publication of false beliefs about the normal behavior of individuals may 
actually have desirable consequences. For instance, if the perceived norm is 
lower than observed behavior (perhaps because of misinformation or in-
transparency), and an agency misreports observed behavior, say, in this case, 
exaggerating compliance with the norm in question, the action can potentially 
“push up” the level of the perceived norm, and therefore have a positive effect 
on observed behavior. Of course, this deceitful behavior raises ethical 
questions, and places the reputation of the publishing authority in question. 
These observations certainly point to a dilemma of public policy, or at least to 
a definite trade-off. 
15.2. Status as a good with externalities 
Esteem complements certain goods, like, for instance, happiness, and 
substitutes for certain other goods, like wage level. Indeed, a survey conducted 
by the author in the city of Siegen, Germany discovered a very strong 
correlation between various indicators of lack of social esteem – surveillance, 
lack of positive commendation, low level of paid vacation time – and a certain 
“money premium”. In other words, people who have less respect on the job 
need to compensate this lack of influence and respect with a certain “wage 
premium”. Receipt of esteem, respect, autonomy and a general sense of 
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contributing to social welfare (altruistic preferences outlined above) therefore 
appear to substitute for this “wage premium”. Frank (1985) also discusses this 
as a likely cause for the – relatively – flattened quality of the wage distribution 
in industries like car salesmen and university professors. 
The price of status may be drawn from Frank (1985), who speaks of 
the dilemma in two dimensions. Firstly, when considering the fact that 
workers are typically not paid their marginal product, as mainstream 
economic theory would have it, Frank suggests that a possible explanation of 
this situation is that an individual's local position is either associated with 
certain costs, or must be compensated, depending on whether the individual 
has a high or low esteem within the organization. Individuals with low 
reputations within the organizations must be compensated for the negative 
status that they receive. They therefore earn more than their marginal 
product. Individuals with higher reputations are in the reverse position: their 
relative high status demands a premium from them: their salaries are less than 
their marginal product. According to this formulation, the wage distribution is 
“flattened out”, which is confirmed in praxis. 
The second, related, dimension is that of an individual deciding 
whether to join an organization in which he or she is a “top dog, but may earn 
less than if he or she shifts allegiances to a competitor, or to switch and enjoy 
higher earnings, but lose the “top dog status. In essence, this is the choice 
Frank (1985) refers to as “choosing the right pond”: one can be a “big fish in a 
small pond”, or a “small fish in a big pond”. Each choice has benefits and each 
has costs. In theory, the dilemma and the respective choices can explain for the 
multiplicity of salaries of relatively similar workers and for the relatively 
“compressed” quality of salaries in the job market. 
15.3. The “Adam Smith problem” 
There has been a long ranging discussion within both the economics 
profession, and within ethics writ large, that there exists a contradiction 
between the ideas of human nature espoused by the moral philosopher and 
economist Adam Smith in the works The Wealth of Nations and Theory of 
Moral Sentiments. The one book, it is argued, espouses a theory of individuals 
as thoroughly moral and other-regarding (“sympathetic”), whereas the other 
seemingly advances a contradictory position of individualistic, self-regarding 
behavior, giving rise to the famous quotation that the butcher and the baker do 
not do business with each other out of mutual sympathy, but self-interest. In 
the next chapter, we will ad-dress why this is not, in fact, an issue. In short, 
there are many instances that suggest a strong contextual influence on human 
preferences, such that certain situations may be gauged more 
“sympathetically”, and others in a more utilitarian fashion, simply on the basis 
of contextual clues. If this is the case, as we will show it is in a wide array of 
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contexts, then it is likely the case that the famed “Adam Smith problem” is, in 
fact, not a problem at all. 
16. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have attempted to outline the economy of esteem, in both 
its supply and demand aspects. Additionally, we discussed the role that esteem 
preferences and esteem goods have on human behavior, the latter exerting 
influence on the fulfilling of the former, and the fact that esteem is not a good 
in the normal sense, and can only be demanded virtually. This is evidenced by 
the reproach which publicity-seeking behavior produces in general, among 
others, via what is referred to as the hedonistic dilemma. Interaction between 
esteem and behavior are visible, for instance, in research on alcohol 
consumption of college students, among others, and certain theoretic models 
exist to capture the interaction between esteem goods and esteem 
preferences, such as the “big fish little pond, little fish big pond” conception of 
Frank (1985). Furthermore, we described the intangible hand, and how its 
employment can help achieve desirable (and undesirable) social 
consequences). We additionally surveyed a number of features of the esteem 
economy, including esteem services, publicity and esteem associations. In 
addition to this, we outlined the effect of punishment and status on the esteem 
economy. Lastly, we summarized a few key problems and pitfalls of the esteem 
economy, including false esteem signals and “Adam Smith problem", which will 
be taken up more extensively in the following chapter. 
State-Dependence 
 
The model of state-dependent preferences offers some tools for including 
extraneous environmental factors and personal assessments of these into 
behavioral models. As such, it offers some useful tools for including certain of 
the features outlined above (namely, social preferences) into a standard 
microeconomic agent-based model. The model augments and is compatible 
with Bayesian rationality. In a nutshell, “state dependence” means that an 
individual's preferences (a utility scalar) consist of a utility function and an 
assessment of the likelihood of the particular outcome or payoff. The latter in 
turn depends on a set of prior states and the acts that elicit the outcomes, and 
it is this last element which represents the “state dependence” in the utility 
scalar: preferences which are state dependent do not display independence 
with regard to the underlying state of nature. 
We therefore have a model with three basic parameters, states, acts 
and outcomes, where a state is a particular state of nature of the type “it is 
raining”, acts are actions taken by the individual agent of the type “watching 
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the soccer match in an open stadium” and out-comes are payoffs of the type 
“getting wet”. These we can represent respectively by the symbols s, f and x, 
where s ∈ S; f ∈ L and x ∈ X. Both acts and outcomes are dependent on states, 
and acts are additionally contingent upon outcomes. The model proceeds with 
expected utility maximization, where u(s) is a utility function. 
The first step in showing that state dependence in preferences is a 
possibility consists of representing preferences as consisting of a combination 
of the utility function described above and the set of acts f ∈ L. A preference 
using this design would resemble the following: 
 
meaning f is weakly preferred to. An individual’s preferences for f weakly 
dominate those for g. This result is featured famously in Friedman and Savage 
(1948). The important feature of this equation is that the preference relation f 
≥ g does not depend on the utility of the respective state.  
 
Ultimately, the preference relation for two states of nature may, in fact, 
differ, even if the outcomes for both are the same. To see this, we need to be 
able to separate beliefs from tastes, which is not directly possible in the above. 
We can achieve the desired effect by introducing belief updating. We introduce 
a parameter p(s) = ∑ f(s), which represents a prior probability distribution in 
the Bayesian sense. p′(s), in turn, represents a posterior probability 
distribution, which is, in effect, an updated belief about the state of nature. 
Preference relations on p′(s) are marked by ≥′. An alternate interpretation of 
this parameter is that p′(s) represents hypothetical probabilities, such as there 
is a 10% chance that it may rain today".  
Preferences of the w(s) sort display an affine quality. To see this, we 
represent the following relation: w′(s) = p′(s)u(s). If both p(s) and p'(s) are 
positive for some constant s, then w(s) = c(s)w(s). This ultimately means 
preference relations on the state s of the type ≥ and ≥′ coincide (i.e., are affine).  
Delimiting the choice subset to a finite set of states and outcomes, we 
can easily come up with a subjective probability distribution with the 
following conditions: a strictly positive probability distribution on S, 
knowledge of the decision makers choices between each and every pair of acts 
contingent on the hypotheticals and knowledge of the decision makers actual 
choices between pairs. An example of an application of this might be seen in 
[?], which studies state-dependence in unemployment. In this example, there 
are only two states: employment and unemployment, and hypotheticals are 
simply exponential functions on the present state. Actual statistical data on 
unemployment, can of course be obtained either with reference to statistical 
agencies (mostly stock-flow data) or by performing natural experiments. 
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17. Applications of State-Dependence 
Applications to the state dependent model are wide-ranging. Heckman and 
Borjas (1980), for instance, devise a model for determining state dependence 
in unemployment. It is easy to imagine how this would occur. The state set is 
strictly finite, with two states: employment and unemployment, the 
probability of which depends on either the present state (Markovian 
dependence), or on past states (occurrence dependence), among others. We 
will not here derive the model employed by Heckman and Borjas (1980), but 
instead merely describe the methodology and the relevance of state 
dependence in the model. The main premise is that it if it is the case that 
(present or past) states of unemployment influence the chance of 
employment, then the likelihood of having a job in period t+i is, in fact, state 
dependent. 
Keane (1997) applies state dependence to consumption behavior of 
households. If state dependence in consumption exists, then having purchased 
a good in period t-1 would affect the likelihood of purchasing the same good in 
period t+i. Hyslop (1999) similarly interpret labor market participation of 
married women. An influence of marriage and pregnancy on labor force 
participation was ultimately discovered. Melino and Yang (2003) discovered 
significant state dependence in risk aversive behavior of investors. A number 
of experiments using the “trust game” revealed strong dependence of fair-
minded behavior in distribution on the level of trust established by the game's 
parameters. Additionally, evidence for “parochial altruism” was established in 
various games involving participants displaying an affinity for either Klee or 
Kandinsky (Bowles & Gintis 2004). A “religion effect” was established in “third 
party punishment” Dictator games, wherein members of the three large 
monotheistic religions displayed much less fair-minded behavior in the 
presence of a third player who served as a “judge” of their behavior (Barr et al. 
2009). These results applied to modernized as well as “primitive" societies 
(see, for instance, Bernhard et al., (2006) for examples among hunter-
gatherers in Papa New Guinea). 
Another issue of relevance, both with regards to altruism and its 
dependence on external states is neurological in nature: to what extent does 
the activation of certain neurotransmitters play a role in eliciting cooperative 
or altruistic behavior? Rilling et al. (2012) and Declerck et al. (2010) studied 
the issue, with interesting results. Oxytocin and Vasopressin both seemed to 
enhance the ability of trust relationships, upon which cooperation depends, to 
develop. This is an interesting result for understanding the circumstances in 
which cooperation may arise. 
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18. The Role of Incentives 
In contrast with the assumption of much of neoclassical economic theory, 
which assumes preferences to be static and separable, a consensus is building 
around the idea that much more dynamic forces are at work in determining 
the content, development and manifestation of preferences. A seminal text in 
this regard is Lucas Jr (1976). In addition, the idea that preferences are truly 
separable is certainly increasingly cast in a doubtful light (Bowles & Polania-
Reyes 2012, 38). Separability involves the exclusive economic implications of 
material incentives (here seen as things like taxes, subsidies and the like) on 
preferences; meaning that it is assumed that incentives only alter the relative 
costs of choices, but do not influence preferences in any other, more 
fundamental, way (for in-stance, signaling of one or another sort). As we will 
show in the following, this is an extraordinarily naive assumption. 
Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) describe two types of preferences 
which incentives chosen by policymakers might influence: so-called state 
dependent and endogenous preferences. They analyze and summarize 
hundreds of trials of various principal-agent games in numerous cultures. 
They discuss three main avenues of incentives influencing, or “crowding”, state 
dependent preferences: “bad news”, “moral disengagement” and “control 
aversion”. The first of these is referred to as “bad news”, and refers to the fact 
that certain desires or motivations of the principal are made known to the 
agent, typically through the principal's own actions. In other words, the use of 
incentives by principals reveals information about the principal, such as his 
beliefs about the agent or his desired outcome of the interaction. The second 
effect, “moral disengagement” consists of the situational cues that tend to 
shape our behavior (often unwittingly). 
The analytical difference between this mechanism and the former is 
that it only reflects the dynamics of the underlying social structure (e.g., in 
experiments, the possible decision tree), and does not convey information 
about the principal or other agents. As such, the effect is distinct from 
incentives set by the principal or other agents in that the underlying social 
structure reflects more appropriate behavior than conveying anything 
meaningful about other actors involved in the game or interaction. The third 
way incentives can influence preferences, broadly referred to as “control 
aversion” consists of the existence or nonexistence of certain feelings of 
autonomy or independence on the part of the agent, the nonexistence of which 
can have drastic – and independent – consequences on the behavior of the 
agent. 
We can refer to the three effects in the following way: as the term “bad 
news” does not capture the opposite effect of “good news”, we will henceforth 
refer to this effect as the “informational effect”. The second effect, likewise, is 
vastly direction-dependent, and we can refer to it as the “ethicality effect” 
(Bowles & Polania-Reyes 2012, 7). The third parameter we can best refer to as 
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the “autonomy effect”. We now discuss the theoretical and empirical basis for 
these three effects briefly. 
 
18.1. Informational parameter 
The informational parameter pertains to the perception of revelation, as a 
consequence of the implementation of certain strategies or actions by the 
principal upon the agent, of beliefs of the principal towards the agent. Fehr & 
Rockenbach (2003) is an example of such an effect at work. German college 
students were designated as either “investors” or “trustees”. Investors were 
given the chance to transfer some amount to the trustees, who then had the 
amount tripled by the experimenter. The latter group could then transfer back 
as much or as little of the transferred amount to the investor group. One 
interesting feature of the experiment is that investors could specify a desired 
amount to be transferred back at the end of the experiment. The 
experimenters designed the game with a mechanism by which investors could 
choose to punish trustees who returned less than the specified amount. 
The findings would surprise anyone holding fast to the Benthamite 
model of homo economicus: trustees granted generous transfers with higher 
back-transfers. The use of the fine reduces the amount of back transfers with 
respect to the amount transferred. Additionally noteworthy is that only one-
third of investors refused the optional fine, and that their back transfers were 
fifty percent higher than those of investors who employed the fine. 
Clearly, the fact of the principal (here, the “trustee”) implementing a 
tactic signaling distrust (or similar interpretations) of the agent affects the 
agent's response (negatively). That is not all. According to research conducted 
by Li et al. (2009), similar threats of sanctions as those described above 
elicited de-activation of the ventromedial PFC, whose functions we discuss in 
later chapters14, and which Li et al. (2009) conclude means a “perception shift” 
to more self-interested behavior (Bowles & Polania-Reyes 2012, 23), 
ultimately amounting to a “crowding out” of social preferences. Similar results 
were also discovered cross culturally in other experiments (Bowles & Polania-
Reyes 2012, 22). 
Of course, the effect could also be imagined to function in the other 
direction. And indeed, as Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012, 28) analyze, such 
“crowding in” or “good news” effects were repeatedly demonstrated. 
18.2. Ethicality effect 
The second state dependent parameter by which incentives influence 
preferences is the way in which incentives change the signals determining 
appropriate behavior. We could also call this the framing effect, though the 
                                                             
14 In that the area is responsible for balancing conflicting “emotional” and “cognitive” 
preferences, signaling a cost involved in the decision. 
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influence we wish to describe is not merely restricted to decision-making, but 
includes their influence on ethical beliefs, dispositions and behaviors, as well. 
A number of studies have been conducted which support the argument that 
decisions made by experimenters in the organization (or even the naming) of 
games has a significant impact on behavior elicited subsequently. The 
argument given ultimately runs along the lines that different “framing” setups 
influence the nature of the decision dynamic, and thereby motivate the use of 
an ethical “on/off switch”. As established by Schotter et al. (1996), market-like 
competition among agents reduces agents’ assessment of the importance of 
fairness. The “religion effect” is of a similar nature. Shifting from a Dictator to a 
“Third party punishment” game reduces the difference in endowment 
allocated between members of the three monotheistic world religions and 
others by nearly 70%. This is a remarkable result. Presumably, it can be 
explained by the shift in the perceived importance of ethical norms when a 
third party is present to adjudicate the situation and react accordingly. 
Again, the argument works in the opposite way, as outlined in the 
previous chapter. Obligatory fines may be an example of ethical “crowding in” 
(Cardenas 2004). If these coalesce with pre-existing social norms, the fines 
may reinforce certain (positive) social behaviors. 
18.3. Autonomy parameter 
The last effect by which state dependent preferences are influenced is the so-
called “autonomy parameter”. Although this parameter intends to measure the 
extent to which individual responds to certain situations of control and 
independence, it is clear that its effects will often be correlated (or even 
coterminous with) the other two. As such, it is analytically challenging, but its 
empirical relevance is clear. Therefore, we will briefly outline its workings as 
discussed by Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012). 
When given a choice to employ a demand for a certain endowment on 
promise of punishment in an experimental setting, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) 
discovered that those principals who used the demand received 50% less than 
those who did not make use of the demand. A similar case in a non-
experimental setting occurred with regards to sick day leave in the Boston Fire 
Dept: 
On December 1, 2001 the Boston Fire Department terminated its 
policy of unlimited paid sick days, replacing it with a 15-day sick 
day limit; pay would be docked for firemen exceeding the limit. 
The firemen responded to the new incentives: those calling in sick 
on Christmas and New Year's Day increased tenfold over the 
previous year (Bowles & Polania-Reyes 2012, 2). 
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It is clear that incentives affecting autonomy, like the other state 
dependent preference parameters above, may exhibit a positive “crowding in” 
effect, as well15. 
19. Conclusion and Synthesis 
A significant literature exists revealing a use and relevance for state-
dependence in preferences. There is both theoretical and empirical evidence 
for the validity of state dependence in a wide array of environments. 
Incentives do not work separately on preferences, meaning that one cannot 
“cleanly” separate preferences into economic and moral elements. Therefore, 
incentives have the characteristic of being able to “crowd in” or “crowd out” 
either or both of these elements. This occurs by one or more of a number of 
vehicles, including providing information about others’ beliefs and intentions, 
“framing” appropriate behavior and by restricting (or enabling) a sense of 
individual autonomy on the part of the individual agent. Examples include the 
change of policy in the Boston fire department, where social preferences were 
likely “crowded out” by a shift in the frame and a loss of autonomy, along with 
a number of other examples cited. 
 In closing the paper, we make the traditional Hegelian spring from 
thesis, antithesis, and at last to synthesis, and attempt to close full circle on the 
issue of how social preferences and state-dependent preferences can be 
brought into further focus in economics research. The chapter will discuss, in 
the order mentioned, the issue of co-evolution as a means of maintaining 
certain institutional status quos; an assessment of the mainstream views on 
social preferences; the importance of making use of the intangible hand in 
policymaking; and the basis of human nature as one not, indeed, captured by 
Benthamite self-regard, but of a social, rounded human agency that considers 
the wider social context for cues and has an extent of sympathy for others. The 
chapter will close by mentioning some computational tools for integrating 
                                                             
15 One could also speak of endogenous preferences when addressing the present 
discussion. However, we will delimit our discussion on that issue and provide 
references to the relevant literature at present. Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012, 9) 
describe the difference between strict state dependent and endogenous preferences in 
the following manner: 
An example unrelated to incentives may clarify the difference between 
endogenous and state-dependent preferences. As Italian residents, your 
authors now eat a lot more pasta than we did in our countries of origin. 
Abstracting from possible international price differences, this could be 
another case of “when in Rome, do as the Romans”. Or it might be that we 
have newly come to enjoy the taste of pasta, perhaps through extensive 
exposure to it while in Italy. Which case it is – state-dependent or 
endogenous preferences – would be revealed by what we will eat back in 
Bogota  or Santa Fe. If we go back to arepas or potatoes, then our taste for 
pasta was state-dependent. If we remain pastaphiles, then our 
preferences have endogenously changed. 
Jerome Nikolai Warren 
 
139 
 
some of the discussed issues into research. As such, we hope to weave the 
thread of the above essay to a close by presenting clearly the gaps in present 
practice as discussed above, in addition to arguing for the merits of changing 
present practice and ultimately providing at least one concrete methodological 
tool to potentially execute this change, i.e., agent based computational 
modeling. 
20. Co-Evolution 
Institutional co-evolution refers to the simultaneous evolution of certain traits 
in societies via the dual route of genetics and culture. Given a certain probable 
base level of altruism (via mutation or migration, for instance), the process of 
multi-level selection can predispose certain behaviors to advance 
evolutionarily via the mechanisms outlined in chapter 4. Certainly, culture, 
imitation and convention play a role, and Brennan and Pettit (2004) discuss 
interesting ways for capturing the process by which such institutional co-
evolution occurs from an economic standpoint. We will label the two views the 
“vanguard model” and the “whistle-blower model” (my own terminology). 
These ultimately are two vehicles facilitating the spread and maintenance of 
certain ideas, institutions, beliefs and practices. 
20.1. Vanguard model 
Assume that compliance with a convention is a binary matter (for simplicity's 
sake). Second, assume a heuristic approach to convention compliance in the 
population generally, the major levers for which are ideal and standard levels 
of compliance. Then, it is easy to imagine the spread of a certain convention as 
a monotone increasing function of the number of adherents to the convention. 
This would, at first glance, seem to be a truism. However, the situation 
demands a more thorough representation than a mere assertion. As such, we 
take the approach employed by Brennan and Pettit (2004) to suggest a 
function with three distinct co-domains: a first section in which no convention 
exists, a second where a small “vanguard” carries out the behavior prescribed 
by the (new) convention, and a third wherein virtually all citizens, or a 
significant number thereof, abide by the convention. 
This could be understood, as Brennan and Pettit (2004) take it to be, to 
reflect the various incentives that arise with reference to esteem, as discussed 
in chapter 9. Indeed, to jump ahead, one can imagine an incentive to act in a 
certain manner as being absent in the first co-domain, when few or none 
engage in the practice. Brennan and Pettit (2004) use the example of recycling. 
As more individuals both espouse the benefits of and engage actively in the 
practice, the level of positive approbation attached in the activity in-creases. 
However, as no overwhelming social norm has been established at this point, 
no negative attitude is associated with not adhering to the convention. In the 
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final co-domain of the compliance function, the practice is so widespread that, 
while at some points there may be a certain (declining) level of positive 
esteem tied to performing the action, increasingly it is negative beliefs and 
perceptions about those failing to comply with the (now) norm that drive 
compliance in the final stages of the adoption of the norm. 
It is easy to see that this model captures one organic route by which 
new institutions develop and proliferate throughout societies. It is possible 
that such institutions have the ability to evolve without the intrusion of state 
power, but it is imaginable that, at the limit, a certain amount of “nudging” 
might be desirable. The heavy state involvement in the spread of renewable 
energy – via feed-in tariffs and the like – is one example. In this case, state 
power can be employed to help the future “vanguard” overcome the strictures 
of institutional paralysis and inertia. 
20.2. Whistle-blower model 
The whistle-blower dilemma consists less of a concept that directly aids in 
institutional development and serves more in terms of guiding institutional 
maintenance. Whistle-blowing clearly has benefits for the maintenance of 
institutions at risk of decline or destruction via opaqueness or corruption. 
These benefits accrue via the aid that whistle-blowing in general offers 
institutions like public opinion in reacting correctly to undesirable behavior 
that might otherwise remain secret. 
The whistle-blowing dilemma assumes a certain degree of rational 
preference-updating behavior, different from the vanguard model, which is 
more concerned with aggregate behavior. In essence, an individual who 
becomes privy to corrupt or intolerant behavior within an institution must 
engage in a continual process of both assessing his level of knowledge of the 
behavior in relation to the standard by which it is measured, and of putting 
this in relation with the context of silence among any colleagues or peers. The 
whistle-blower dilemma serves as a check on coarsely reporting information 
that may more efficiently be dealt with internally. As Brennan and Pettit 
(2004) state: 
In lots of cases, I will not be the only person in a position to have 
information about a suspected case. In deciding whether to blow 
the whistle in such a case, I rationally focus my attention on the 
circumstances in which my action will make a difference. And the 
only case in which this is so is when no one else blows the 
whistle. For if someone else blows the whistle I don't need to. 
This fact gives me pause. Because there is, after all, some 
uncertainty about whether whistle-blowing is actually justified – 
uncertainty about the facts of the case, about the consequences of 
going public, and so on. And I realize that each other person is 
making an independent assessment of these considerations and 
that, in the only case that matters (i.e., where my action is 
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decisive), none of those others has decided that the 
circumstances justify proceeding. 
Ultimately, whistle-blowing in principle aids the maintenance of social 
norms by compensating for a failure of one or more of the other institutions 
discussed above, which can fail for a number of reasons, including a process of 
“reverse Darwinism”, where nepotism facilitates a process of cronyism and 
corruption. 
Whistle-blowing is linked to the issue of social esteem, because 
whistle-blowers tend to suffer loss of esteem by coming forward, and whistle-
blowing can destroy the esteem of the implicated organizations. The very real 
risks of extraordinarily adverse implications for both individuals and 
institutions naturally mean that institutions have a natural incentive to 
mitigate whistle-blowing from occurring that may go above and beyond the 
necessary.16 This situation can have potentially detrimental effects on the 
ability of whistle-blowing to function properly. This situation is basically one 
of moral hazard, where two parties in a contract have split incentives. It 
provides a strong argument for the need of neutral, nonpartisan institutions 
that serve to protect and facilitate whistle-blowers and the whistle-blowing 
process. Wide-ranging immunity and political asylum – as is present with 
respect to cartel law – are examples of such necessary protections. They, in 
fact, serve to insure the proper working of whistle-blowing as a check on 
opaqueness and corruption of fixed social institutions. 
21. An Assessment of the Mainstream View 
 
A number of field experiments have shown that a failure to adequately reflect 
on certain social preferences (see chapter 4 above) leads to poor policy, or, at 
least, policy which is not fully “thought out”. The Boston fire department 
example shows how this might be the case. Incentives and institutional 
mechanisms which obfuscate social preferences, for instance, by clouding 
agent autonomy or by revealing antipathetic beliefs or intentions on the part 
of principals or other agents, can lead to “crowding out” of moral as well as of 
economic motivations (to be seen largely as non-separable). This in turn can 
lead to a distortion in the effectiveness of policies, what Bowles and Polania-
Reyes (2012) refer to as “naï ve” policy. Naive policy consists of measures that 
fail to adequately reflect on their own impact on beliefs and preferences, 
thereby leading to a “crowding out” of some or all of the intended effects. The 
cases of the trust and gift games discussed above should serve to concretize 
                                                             
16 One can see this, for instance, in the Obama administration's extremely vigilant 
attitude toward discovering and prosecuting whistle-blowers internal to the 
administration and government. 
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this. Most of these shortcomings are discussed in further detail in the above 
work, and are only summarized here to point out the main conclusions drawn 
in the preceding sections. 
21.1. Preference separability 
Important problems for social policy with regards to social preferences in 
economics research is the often occurring (and, as above described, incorrect) 
assumption of preference separability. Under this rubric, “moralę preferences 
can be neatly distinguished from “economicę ones: we read The Wealth of 
Nations at the workplace, and the Theory of Moral Sentiments in bed at night. 
Contradictions to this belief are drawn up in Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012). 
As pointed out in chapter 16, there are a number of fallacies with the 
assumption of preference separability, including the outlined autonomy, 
informational and ethicality (and other) parameters of state dependent 
preferences, and the lack of any substantive evidence for the phenomenon. 
The fact of interdependence between “ethical” and “economic” preference 
should therefore play a more prominent role in economic (and more general 
social) modeling. 
21.2. Policy trade-offs 
One manifestation of preference interdependence is encountered in the public 
goods example of dealing with free-riding. Policymakers can attempt to 
discourage this behavior in a number of ways, including by subsidizing pro-
social behavior. However, doing so might create a situation where the 
perception of motives by people behaving in a pro-social manner is of having 
been done for pecuniary reward (so-called “he's doing it for the money” 
perception). As such, esteem and altruistic incentives may be “crowded out” by 
policy frameworks focusing only on the free-riding problem to the exclusion of 
preference interdependence. 
To continue with the present example, it may in fact be determined to 
be beneficial to have a subsidy, in the end, either because it is at such a low 
level, or the “crowding out” effect so small in comparison with the benefits 
accrued from the subsidy that the latter effects outweigh any undesirable 
outcomes. It is worth pointing out that “naï ve” policy is not necessarily 
coterminous with “excessive” policy: in many cases, a libertarian point of view 
can create just as undesirable a situation with respect to social policy as a 
situation where incentives are excessively employed. Financial regulation is 
one clear example of this. “Naï ve”, ultimately, entails simply any situation 
where policymakers fail to reflect adequately on the interplay between 
preferences and incentives. Discussion of this issue can be found in Cardenas 
(2004), Al-Ubaydli et al. (2013), Vertova and Galbiati (2010). 
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22. Making Use of the Intangible Hand 
Having made the case for the existence of social preferences, one can ask the 
famous question “whither now?” or “what is to be done?”. How does one 
incorporate the findings and revelations discussed and described in the above 
into economic theory and research in general? It will be our argument in this 
section that a great tool for policymakers to employ when attempting this task 
is the intangible hand, discussed and outlined above. We will discuss a number 
of cases that briefly illustrate how policymakers can potentially elicit desirable 
responses with reference to the intangible hand. 
In one case (Lewin 2015), a recent report suggests that thousands of 
Chinese women fly the U.S. every year in order to give birth to American 
citizens. These women often pay upwards of $60,000 in order to receive this 
privilege. There are obvious moral reservations as to this type of behavior, not 
least of which is the obvious disparities this creates between Chinese with and 
without the means to solicit such services. States can take a wide range of 
actions to curb the behavior. One example might be publicizing the views of 
the broad public on women who pay to give birth to their children in the U.S. 
The principle of pluralistic ignorance suggests that the real views of citizens 
on this issue may be different from perceived norms. Having the real views of 
the citizenry published may in fact reveal the stigma attached to the activity, 
and hasten to curtail the motivation to do it in the first place. Additionally, the 
principle of parochial altruism tells us that this policy may be more effective if 
enacted in China, rather than in the U.S., since members of many societies 
value the beliefs, judgments and approbation of their fellow citizens more than 
those of outsiders. 
With regards to recent revelations of illegal activities by a number of 
large international banks, it may be the case that more stringent action is 
ultimately necessary to curb the undesirable activity than merely publishing a 
list of “bad banks”. However, the intangible hand can prepare the waters for 
the wider berth of the iron hand of state power. Indeed, the issue of publicity 
discussed above may come to the fore here. As discussed in chapter 9, 
publicity has the potential to push perceived standards either upward or 
down, and revelations of clearly systematic extortion, bribery, manipulation 
and money laundering would, according to common sense, push them 
downwards. As discussed above, this situation could in some instances be 
undesirable. However, it may push them down far enough that a tipping point 
is reached, whereby a consensus forms around the idea that the present 
system and its rules are corrupt or in need of reform.17 In this regard, the 
intangible hand can serve both to extend the reach of the invisible hand, as 
well as to determine where and when the iron hand of state power is 
necessary. 
                                                             
17 See, for instance, Arnold (2015). 
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Lastly, it is important to remember, when considering policy 
alternatives, that there may be a fallacy in simply taking preferences as given. 
As Brennan and Pettit (2004, 251) state: “Mainstream economics does not 
have to judge on the merits of the preferences or the individuals in play; it 
simply works with the assumption that whatever people's preferences in the 
sphere of the material economy, it is better to have more preference 
satisfaction than less. In that sense economics operates with a thin theory of 
the good: it does not introduce any exogenous or thick criteria of assessment." 
Indeed, a relevant question for policymakers is how to use the intangible hand 
in order to achieve socially desirable outcomes in situations where the 
absence of external influence might lead to a less desirable outcome. Examples 
of this might be smoking or teenage pregnancy. As pointed out in our 
introductory chapter, more preferences satisfaction is not necessarily a good 
thing! 
23. Homo Socialis? 
Although a growing segment of economics research incorporates elements of 
other-regarding preferences in models and theories18, the continuity of this 
trend with the rest of the discipline (in particular with introductory 
coursework) is lacking. The dominant model in economics, as taught in 
textbooks and recited in lecture halls around the world in various 
undergraduate and graduate level economics programs, is that of homo 
economicus, a self-interested, utility-maximizing individual agent. It is likely 
that this model fits well with the dictates of neoclassical theory, and this 
explanation may serve to account for the lack of alternative behavioral models 
of human behavior. However, as we have shown in the above, this model has 
deep problems – some obvious, some less so. Most principally, human agents 
in many cases display systematic deviations from the utility maximizing 
dictate of the homo economicus. Including this fact in models of human agency 
would serve not only the strength of economic models in terms of predictive 
and explanatory capacity, but would also lend some level of continuity 
between models and reality, an element that certain economists argue is 
lacking in the discipline today19, sacrificed for the sake of parsimony and rigor. 
In this regard, Herbert Gintis speaks of a “physics envy” among the economics 
profession. 
The lack of regard for esteem and altruistic preferences in research, 
despite the wide array of evidence for them, has the potential to discredit 
                                                             
18 For a prime example, consider the wide array of research into so-called behavioral 
economics. 
19 Additionally, it could be argued that the falsifiability of a science depends to a great 
deal on the ability for theories within that science to be tested and verified. It is hard 
to test a theory that has virtually no bearing on reality. 
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social science research in general by diminishing its legitimacy (that is, its 
legitimacy as a genuine scientific undertaking). It is likely that a main reason 
for the lack of esteem preferences in economic modeling is the complexity of 
the emotions and states involved. Nevertheless, as we will argue in the 
following section, the state of modern computing is such that even extremely 
intricate and subtle details of behavior and preferences can be relatively 
accurately represented in certain modeling systems. It would arguably 
behoove researchers to familiarize them-selves with the methods detailed 
below to more fully come to grasps with the full range of human behavior and 
action.20 
And there clearly is a range of human behavior. The above text has 
attempted to point out the failure of models that imply a thoroughly rational, 
self-regarding agent with exogenous preferences to adequately reflect the 
breadth and scope of human behavior, to their own detriment. New models are 
needed to augment (and potentially replace) homo economicus as benchmark 
behavioral schemes. One such model is homo socialis, which assumes a varying 
degree of social preferences in individuals, that may and can have “feed-back 
effects” on economic preferences. As outlined in the above chapters, this 
model much more accurately captures real dynamics of human behavior and 
has the ability to capture the more full range of human behavior – even as it 
relates to economic realities. As such, the author will make the rather strong 
assertion that, save for specific contexts where the significance is spelled out 
clearly, the homo economicus model should be updated to the standards of 
homo socialis. 
24. Agent-Based Behavioral Modeling 
Agent-based behavioral computational economic (ACE) modeling offers an 
expansive palate of tools that researchers can apply to solving a lot of the 
systematic problems outlined above in engaging in economic analysis. Agent-
based modeling goes back at least to the middle of the last century, to the von 
Neumann machine. This and other early examples of agent-based systems 
allowed relatively simple systems with rudimentary parameters to replicate 
and coordinate autonomously, thereby allowing for a certain level of 
abstraction or simulation. The science has certainly advanced leaps and 
bounds since the 1940s, and much of what is possible today with agent-based 
modeling can include many subtleties and nuances of human (and 
environmental) behavior and predispositions. Tesfatsion (2003) describes 
agent-based behavioral modeling as “encouraging economists to address 
                                                             
20 Certainly, it can be argued that for the purpose of “back of the envelope” 
calculations, an optimization here and a Lagrangian there might do the job required, 
but where more detailed results are necessary, one should not shy away from more 
sophisticated methods merely because they weren't featured in the textbook. 
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growth, distribution, and welfare issues in a more comprehensive manner 
embracing a variety of economic, social, political, and psychological factors, 
thus restoring the broad vision of early political economists.” 
Indeed, it is arguably intellectually more challenging to derive a model 
that is not only predictively but also conceptually accurate. Opposing 
Friedman (1953), that the only measures of the value of an economic model 
should be simplicity and fruitfulness, this point of view would advance as a 
reservation that contemporary computational power is sufficient in order to 
entertain more complex facets of economic and social life within the scope of 
models, while not losing any of the predictive power or “fruitfulness” of the 
model. In fact, such a view would continue, holding on to various elements of 
neoclassical analysis derived in the 19th century to the detriment of newer 
and more efficient methods of analysis serves to hold the discipline of 
economics in the terrain of non-evolutionary sciences, as Thorsten Veblen 
argued 100 years ago. 
What role computation and programming play in this is not certain. 
What is certain is that economies are social systems that are also prone to the 
laws of evolution delineated briefly above, and therefore change in terms of 
their parameters and configurations and ordering over the course of time and 
history. Assessing, describing and interpreting such a dynamic system 
arguably requires more complex tools than neoclassical analysis provides, and 
simplicity and elegance are in this case not necessarily desirable, as social 
systems are messy. Computation allows a researcher to capture some of that 
messiness without losing any of the explanatory power of good models. As 
Tesfatsion (2006) states: 
For economic purposes, computer programming is in some ways 
more powerful [than differential calculus] in that it facilitates the 
modeling of complex interactive processes involving kinks, jumps, 
and other forms of discreteness imposed or induced by empirical 
constraints. Consequently, programming frees us to adapt the tool 
to the problem rather than the problem to the tool21. 
25. Concluding Remarks 
It appears then that a number of fundamental features of the homo economicus 
model, namely that of expected utility maximization, Benthamite self-regard 
and methodological individualism, are premised on assumptions that at best 
hold up only tentatively, either in severely constrained environments, or with 
the addition of highly implausible preconditions. This means that, while the 
model may apply in certain settings, and particularly those where a large 
amount of cost-benefit analysis devoid of moral constraints is encountered, its 
                                                             
21 Tesfatsion (2006) ends this passage by calling for “every graduate economics 
program” to include programming language requirements. 
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applicability is by no means universal. Alternate models that reflect other 
aspects of human agency were suggested in the above, and particular 
emphasis was given to models that include social preferences and preferences 
that are context dependent (so-called state-dependent preferences). 
Ultimately, there are critical aspects that have been glossed over in the present 
work. This should by no means discount the salience or significance of these 
aspects. The present work, however, being limited in scope (and length), was 
written with certain emphases that resulted from the given constraints of the 
project at hand. 
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Abstract: This paper describes using current literature and research a 
problem that has plagued social scientists for centuries, that of "moral 
sentiments”. Human beings are inherently social by nature and hold certain 
regard for others’ opinions (esteem preferences) as well as for others 
generally (altruism). It is argued in the article that such preferences may in 
fact be consistent with a core rational human agent. It is furthermore argued 
that the lack of regard for such preferences in social sciences research (and 
particularly within the domain of economics) severely weakens models and 
theories in the respective disciplines. A few potential avenues for including 
social preferences writ large into social science (read: economic) modeling are 
outlined. 
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